Case Closed: Federal Courts Resolve the Question of an Exclusive Licensee\u27s Ability to Sublicense a Copyright by Ayers, Emily
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review Law Reviews
1-1-2004
Case Closed: Federal Courts Resolve the Question
of an Exclusive Licensee's Ability to Sublicense a
Copyright
Emily Ayers
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Emily Ayers, Case Closed: Federal Courts Resolve the Question of an Exclusive Licensee's Ability to Sublicense a Copyright, 24 Loy. L.A. Ent.
L. Rev. 185 (2004).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/elr/vol24/iss1/8
CASE CLOSED: FEDERAL COURTS RESOLVE
THE QUESTION OF AN EXCLUSIVE LICENSEE'S
ABILITY TO SUBLICENSE A COPYRIGHT
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal copyright law is the vehicle through which statutory rights
and protections are defined for authors of artistic and literary expression.
Within this construct, the law defines the parameters for licensees to com-
mercially exploit their works.' As technology advances, however, intellec-
tual property developers demand correlative changes in copyright law to
keep in step with their needs.2 The law should be flexible enough to stay
relevant, yet clear and consistent enough to be followed.
Legislators made sweeping changes to copyright law through the en-
actment of the Copyright Act of 1976. 3 Though legislators and courts did
not eliminate all remnants of the previous Copyright Act of 1909, those
elements retained play a minor role in contemporary regulation. 4 Until re-
cently, licensees successfully broadened those statutory policies in their fa-
vor, persuading courts to back their position.5 The licencees' stance pur-
ported to advance exploitive efficiency, the free transferability of property
interests, and divisibility of copyright interests. 6 The Ninth Circuit, how-
ever, initiated a shift from these policies by siding with copyright licensors,
and some courts are following suit. 7 Yet, with federal circuits coming to
different conclusions on the same questions of law, clarity is overdue in de-
fining the rights of a licensee. To stop the confusion and to end the contro-
versy in this area of law, the legislature should establish uniform, compre-
1. See Peter H. Kang & Jia Ann Yang, Doctrine of Indivisibility Revived? Ninth Circuit
Confirms Copyright Exclusive Licensee Has No Right to Transfer License Absent Owner's Con-
sent: Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 18 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 365, 366 (2002).
2. See id.
3. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
4. See Kang & Yang, supra note 1, at 366.
5. See id. at 366-67.
6. See id. at 367.
7. See Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Ward v. Nat'l Geo-
graphic Soc'y, 208 F. Supp. 2d 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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hensive guidelines for licensing copyrights.
Federal courts have attempted to balance the rights of copyright own-
ers and their licensees. Adding weight to each scale is the scope of the li-
cense and those rights that come with the ownership of a copyright. One
court recently addressed whether this ownership, when held by a licensee,
includes an unlimited right of transferability.8 In Gardner v. Nike, Inc., a
case regarded by a California district court as one of first impression, the
plaintiffs challenged a licensor that demanded consent before sublicensing
an exclusive copyright when their agreement was silent on the issue.9
Could an individual sublicense a copyright without the original licensor's
consent? The Gardner court held that the licensor's consent was necessary,
preserving select policies of the 1909 Act.'0 This decision sparked a con-
troversy that had its share of critics and supporters within the legal com-
munity. 1 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district
court, and other circuits are now following Gardner's holding. 2 The fed-
eral judiciary clarified the sublicensing question without broadening the
rights of licensees beyond that which the legislature may have intended. 3
The Supreme Court may get the opportunity to settle the controversy if it
chooses to grant certiorari.
This comment reviews recent developments regarding the issue of
copyright transferability and interprets relevant provisions of the Copyright
Act of 1976. Part II retraces the history of copyright law leading up to the
recent clash over licensees' rights and the transferability of a copyright.
Part III examines the circuit split, and compares those courts' divergent ap-
proaches to interpreting the Copyright Act of 1976. Part IV analyzes the
1909 and 1976 Acts, highlighting policies in favor of Gardner, and inter-
prets subsequent cases following the holding in the case. This comment
concludes that the Gardner court correctly affirmed the lower court's hold-
ing which requires consent before a sublicense can be granted, and that the
Supreme Court should uphold the ruling of the Ninth Circuit if it chooses to
8. Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1284 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
9. Id. Leicester v. Warner Bros. had already analyzed the question of licensee sublicensing,
thus it is curious that the court would consider Gardner a case of first impression. Though Leices-
ter may be distinguishable on its facts, it is unusual that rather than explain Leicester's divergent
nature, the Court chose to not mention the case at all. See Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d
1212 (9th Cir. 2000).
10. Gardner, 279 F.3d at 777.
11. See Kang & Yang, supra note 1, at 366-67, 375.
12. Gardner, 279 F.3d at 781. The Second Circuit followed Gardner, establishing what
seems to be a decisive trend on the issue of licensor consent for sublicensing a copyright. This
connection will be discussed in Part III of this article. Ward, 208 F. Supp. 2d 429.
13. Gardner, 279 F.3d at 781.
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grant certiorari.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF COPYRIGHT LAW
Over the last century, copyright law slowly shifted in response to
technological change.14 In the past thirty years, technological advances oc-
curred at a rapid pace. As a result, some of the copyright concepts of the
past are no longer aligned with market realities. 15 Users demand more lib-
eral policies to accommodate the progress of technology, as the number of
uses for copyrighted materials increases.1 6 Lawmakers have incorporated
such considerations into legislation in an attempt to modernize copyright
law to make it more practical. 7 However, the vastly divergent interests ad-
vocated by licensors and licensees complicated the law-making process;
licensees are concerned with the potential monopolization by owners of
their works, while licensors have fought to preserve the rights of authors
and composers to foster creativity.' 8
At its inception, copyright law was developed to protect the rights of
the copyright owner. Accordingly, statutes protected a licensor's ability to
maintain ownership of a copyright and to control the use of that intellectual
property.' 9 The framers of the Constitution recognized both the significance
of protecting this statutory right and the need for universal policies among
the states to govem copyright regulation.20 Consequently, they designated
Congress as the ultimate governing body of copyright law, creating a con-
stitutional basis of copyright protection and empowering Congress to enact
uniform copyright legislation. 2' Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the United
States Constitution states, "The Congress shall have Power... To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."
22
14. David L. Hitchcock & Kathy E. Needleman, Current Status of Copyright Protection in
the Digital Age and Related Topic, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 539, 541 (2002).
15. Id.
16. See id. at 542.
17. See id.
18. See, e.g., Kang & Yang, supra note 1, at 369.
19. See generally CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW §§ 1.03(B)-(C)(1) (5th ed. 2001)
(discussing the passage of the first federal copyright act in 1790 and general provisions of the
1909 Copyright Act).
20. See id. § 1.03(B).
21. See Hitchcock & Needleman, supra note 14, at 544.
22. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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The Copyright Act of 1909 was the first extensive codification of fed-
eral copyright law.23 In the Act, Legislators crafted the doctrine of indivisi-
bility, a central concept influencing the fundamental interpretations of
copyright law.2 4 According to this doctrine, anything less than a total trans-
fer of rights under copyright law was considered a mere license. Thus, the
license conferred upon a licensee was merely an implied agreement by the
licensor not to sue for the copyright's use.2 6 The licensee had permission to
engage in the licensed act, but because actual ownership rights were re-
tained by the licensor, a licensee could not sublicense the copyright or sue
an infringer without first persuading the copyright proprietor to join the
cause of action.27 At that time, copyrights were primarily exploited through
the reproduction of copies, and a copyright holder's principal concern was
the prevention of a non-owner from infringing upon her reproduction
right.2"
Another noteworthy feature of the Copyright Act of 1909 was its
clear distinction between a license and an assignment. 29 An assignee ac-
quired the proprietorship of the copyright, and could bring an infringement
action in court.30 A licensee, by comparison, did not obtain actual owner-
ship rights, and lacked standing to bring a cause of action against an in-
fringer on her own.3 1 The 1909 Act created less of a distinction between an
exclusive and a non-exclusive license.32 The Act defined an exclusive li-
cense as conferring certain rights to a single licensee, and a non-exclusive
license as a grant of rights to multiple licensees. 33 Under the 1909 Act, nei-
ther an exclusive nor a non-exclusive licensee could transfer the license
23. The Copyright Act of 1790 was the first enacted statute, most of which remained intact
until the revised Copyright Act of 1909. See BRUCE P. KELLER & JEFFREY P. CUNARD,
COPYRIGHTLAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE § 1.3 (Practising Law Institute, 2002).
24. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.0 1(A) (Mat-
thew Bender & Co., Inc. 2001) [hereinafter NIMMER].
25. Gardner, 279 F.3d at 778 (citing 3 NIMMER, supra note 24, § 10.01(A)). Under the doc-
trine of indivisibility, the bundle of rights afforded to a copyright was said to be "indivisible," and
assignment must be a transfer of the totality of rights. The basis for this approach stemmed from
specific language of the 1909 Act, which referred only to a singular copyright, thus inferring that
the copyright was incapable of assignment in parts. Any transfer of less than a totality of rights
would only constitute a mere license. 3 NIMMER, supra note 24, at § 10.01(A).
26. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 24, § 10.01(A).
27. Id. § 10.01(C)(1).
28. Id. § 10.01(A).
29. See id.
30. See id. § 10.01(C)(1).
31. 3 NIMMER, supra note 24, § 10.01(C)(1).
32. See id.
33. Id.
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without first obtaining the licensor's consent.34 Part IV of this comment
elaborates upon the significance of these definitions, and discusses modem
translations of these terms.35
A. Copyright Act of 1976
Over time, licensees gained support in the market by promoting effi-
ciency in copyright exploitation, and discouraging monopolistic control by
copyright owners.36 Although views in the marketplace began to tilt in their
favor, 37 licensees' rights were still bound by the Copyright Act of 1909,38
which began to show signs of aging as advances in technology increasingly
distorted the traditional lines of copyrightable material. 39 Thus, aging laws
served as a barrier to the most productive use of copyrightable material.40
Consequently, Congress sought to repair the problems of federal copyright
law with the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976.4'
Prior to the enactment of the 1976 Act, the most problematic techno-
logical advancement facing copyright owners was the ease with which ma-
terial could be inexpensively reproduced. In addition, other rights beyond
the reproduction right, such as the right to prepare derivative works, be-
came increasingly valuable, yet copyright owners were still incapable of
reserving those rights.43 The 1909 Act had become so outdated that state
common law rights were filling the gaps in copyright proceedings.
44
After years of extensive debate, Congress once again codified U.S.
copyright law when it enacted the Act of 1976.45 Legislators finally re-
leased copyright law from the shackles of the doctrine of indivisibility,
34. See id.
35. Before Gardner was decided, courts interpreting the 1976 Act made virtually no distinc-
tion between an assignee and an exclusive licensee, as both obtained ownership and could subli-
cense without the owner's consent.
36. See, e.g., Hitchcock & Needleman, supra note 14, at 542.
37. Id.
38. Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
17 U.S.C.).
39. See Hitchcock & Needleman, supra note 14, at 541.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See 3 NlMMER,supra note 24, § 10.01(A).
44. See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 19, § 1.03(C)(1). Copyright protection under the 1909 Act
began at the moment of publication, as opposed to when the title was filed for registration under
the prior provision. This distinction resulted in a dual system: unpublished works retained state
common law protection, while published works were covered by federal law.
45. Id. § 1.03(C)(3). Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
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seeking to restore the balance between the competing interests of copyright
claimants and their licensees.46 This expanded the power of the federal
government to enforce copyright law, and overruled any then conflicting
state law under the Supremacy Clause. 47 Moreover, by excluding the doc-
trine of indivisibility from the Act of 1976, Congress modified five basic
areas of copyright law: standing to sue, the right to claim copyright, the
recordation of assignments, the right to resell a copyright, and certain copy-
right formalities. 8 However, the actual effect of this legislation on each of
these areas was initially difficult to decipher.49
Initially, interpreters of the law wrestled with the question of how to
separate a single copyright, which was now divisible, into its respective
parts.50 Did the single, original copyright suddenly become multiple copy-
rights held by each party? Melville and David Nimmer ("Nimmer"), the
leading commentators on copyright law, discuss several problems with the
"multiple copyright" theory, emphasizing that compliance with certain pub-
lication, registration, and notice provisions would create significant admin-
istrative difficulties.5 ' More importantly, the potential ramifications of the
resulting policy under a "multiple copyright" scheme are unclear. The crea-
tion of a "new copyright" might justify unconsented sublicensing, assum-
ing that the original copyright effectively disappeared with the original
copyright claimant's rights.5 2 The majority's interpretation of the 1976 Act
permits divisibility of rights, not divisibility of the copyright.
53
The protections afforded by the 1976 Copyright Act envelops several
rights, including an owner's reproduction rights, public performance and
display rights, adaptation rights, and distribution rights in the copyright-
protected work. 54 In particular, section 106 of Title 17 enumerates the ex-
clusive right of a copyright owner: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work
in copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copy-
46. Compare Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 §§ 1, 6 (1909) with
17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 201 (2000).
47. Hitchcock & Needleman, supra note 14, at 544. See discussion infra Part IV for a cri-
tique of federal versus state law, which disapproves of Aaron Xavier Fellmeth's argument that
state law should have governed in Gardner.
48. 3 NIMMER, supra note 24, § 10.02(B)(t)-(5).
49. See id.
50. See id. § 10.02(A).
51. Id. § 10.02(C)(1)(a)-(c)(discussing the difficulties that arise under the Act's require-
ments, through hypothetical publication, registration, and notice problems).
52. See id.
53. Id. § 10.02(C)(2).
54. Hitchcock & Needleman, supra note 14, at 544-45.
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righted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by
rental, lease, or lending; (4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and
choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audio-
visual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; (5) in the case of
literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pic-
torial, graphic, or sculptural works, including individual images of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly;
and (6) in the case of sound recording, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.5"
B. Statutory Text and Legislative Intent
The enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act altered central features of
copyright law.56 As a preliminary matter, courts applied the 1976 Act to
works created on or after January 1, 1978, with the 1909 Act remaining
relevant for most works created before January 1, 1978. 57 A distinguishing
factor of the 1976 Act was Congress's new approach to the nature of a
copyright, enumerated in section 106: "[The o]wner of the equitable title of
copyright is not a mere licensee, and he may sue in equity, particularly
where owner of legal title is an infringer, or one of the infringers, thus oc-
cupying a position hostile to the plaintiff., 58 This provision conferred
standing upon an exclusive licensee to sue in his own name for an in-
fringement of that particular right.59 The Act reflected the manifestation of
copyright divisibility by explicitly providing what situations amounted to a
"transfer of copyright ownership," specifically an "assignment, mortgage,
exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of
a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright,
whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a
nonexclusive license. 6 °
55, 17 U.S.C. § 106. In addition to granting these rights, the 1976 Act retained the principle
of unlimited alienability of copyright, which compelled authors to assign, license, and waive each
of these exploitation rights when the copyright was assigned. See generally Neil Netanel, Aliena-
bility Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States and Continental
Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 1-78 (1994).
56. See generally Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§
101-801).
57. BRUCE P. KELLER & JEFFREY P. CUNARD, COPYRIGHT LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE
§ 3.1 (Practising Law Institute, 2003).
58. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C § 106).
59. 3 NIMMER, supra note 24, § 10.02(B)(1).
60. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101). Excluding
a nonexclusive licensee's ability to transfer the copyright is reminiscent of the 1909 Act's doc-
trine of indivisibility. A residue of the doctrine's impact is thus retained under the 1976 Act re-
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Still, the statutory language fails to clarify the precise nature of a li-
censee's rights, and how implicated parties were to apply the law in a prac-
tical manner.61 Central to this ambiguity is the question of transferability of
62the license. Several sections of the 1976 Act, some in conjunction and
others seemingly in opposition, function to redefine license ownership.
Section 201(d)(1) rejects most of the doctrine of indivisibility, allowing
portions of the copyright to be transferred by either assignment or license.63
The 1976 Act outlines those interests in copyright law that could benefit
from ownership rights. Section 101 specifically incorporates ownership
into an assignment, mortgage, and exclusive license, but does not include
these right for a nonexclusive license.64 Thus, while the statute clearly
enumerates that a nonexclusive license is not a "transfer" of copyright own-
ership, it fails to describe the actual scope of such transferability for the
61listed conveyances. In fact, nowhere in the statute did Congress directly
address an exclusive licensee's ability to transfer the copyright, and
whether they intended to maintain the scope of the 1909 Act.66 This con-
gressional silence may mean either that the legislature deferred to the
judgment of the courts, or that the question was already resolved in another
section of the Act.
67
The second sentence of section 201 (d)(2) seems to define the scope of
the rights granted to a holder of some copyright interest, providing that,
"the owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of that
right, to all of the protections and remedies accorded to the copyright
owner by this title. 68 This language, however, stands in opposition to sec-
tion 201 (d)(1) by restricting the scope of ownership to only the "protections
and remedies" and not to all rights under the copyright.69 For instance, one
garding nonexclusive licenses. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 24, § 10.02(A). The legislative history
of the 1976 Act discusses concept of divisibility, stating that section 201(d)(2) "contains the first
explicit statutory recognition of the divisibility of copyright in our law." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 123, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5738.
61. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-122, 501-513.
62. See generally id. § 201.
63. Id. § 201 (d)(2). This section describes the transfer of ownership, stating "The ownership
of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation
of law, and may be bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of in-
testate succession." Id.
64. Id. § 101.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
68. Id. § 201(d)(2).
69. Michael I. Rudell, Court Imposes Restriction on Exclusive Licensee's Right to Assign,
Articles of Interest, Franklin, Weinrib, Rudell & Vassallo, P.C., at
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can infer that an exclusive licensee is entitled to ownership without the
right of transfer because the statute refers to such a licensee as "the owner
of any particular exclusive right."70 Courts have interpreted this statutory
silence differently; some courts inferred an acquiescence of the 1976 Act to
retain the approach of the 1909 Act, which grants ownership only to the li-
censor. 7' Part IV of this comment will further analyze the Court's ultimate
interpretation of this inconsistency.
The text of the 1976 Act also muddles the traditional distinction be-
tween a license and an assignment under the property laws. An assignment,
in the most elementary sense, is a transfer to another of one's rights or
property interest.72 A license, on the other hand, is a right granted to a per-
son to do something which he otherwise could not legally do; a license can
be retracted, revoked, or otherwise limited in scope or duration by the li-
cense owner. 73 If the 1976 Act granted to a licensee all ownership rights
under the copyright, including an unlimited right of transferability, then a
license would be the functional equivalent of an assignment.7a As this
comment argues, the legislature may have retained a distinction between
these terms by textually implying that certain elements of the doctrine of
indivisibility were retained in a license, but not in an assignment.75 In sum,
the text of the 1976 Act neither expressly confers to a licensee a right to as-
sign a license, nor prohibits such an assignment absent the licensor's con-
sent.76
The Committee Notes of the House of Representatives often serve to
clarify textual inconsistencies by revealing the legislature's actual intent in
formulating the law. Unfortunately, the legislative history of the 1976 Act
provides no clear direction in reconciling what appears to be conflicting
sections of the 1976 Act.77 The Notes of Committee on the Judiciary lack
any indication that Congress intended to grant an exclusive licensee the
http://www.fwrv.com/articles/artmir0301 .html (last visited Aug. 28, 2003).
70. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (emphasis added).
71. Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Control Without Interest: State Law of Assignment, Federal
Preemption, and the Intellectual Property License, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8, 13 (2001).
72. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 115 (7th ed. 1999).
73. Id. at 931.
74. Rudell, supra note 69.
75. See id.
76. See Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 201).
77. See United States v. Hockings, 129 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that if the
language of a statute is unclear, the court should study its legislative history to aid its interpreta-
tion). The "legislative history" of the Copyright Act of 1976 actually encompasses twenty-one
years of reports and hearings, beginning in 1955. JOYCE ET AL., supra note 19, § 1.03(C)(3).
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right to sublicense the copyrighted interest.78 Congress took into account
the limitations that the 1909 Act placed on a licensee's ability to transfer a
copyright, and retained the spirit of that notion by restricting the benefits
conferred to a licensee to the "protections and remedies" afforded to the
owner.
79
Such an interpretation of a license is in harmony with the underlying
premise of the 1976 Act. The legislative history does reveal Congress'
acute awareness of its responsibility to maintain the delicate balance be-
tween the competing interests of licensors and licensees. 80 As history sug-
gests, Congress may have used the term "owner" to indicate the abolition
of indivisibility under copyright law, and not to grant licensees outright
ownership rights.81
C. Case Law under the Copyright Act of 1909
Under the 1909 Act, a licensee did not have the ability to transfer
rights under the license without the consent of the licensor.82 In Harris v.
Emus Records Corp.,83 the court held that, under the 1909 Act, a copyright
license (whether exclusive or not) was not transferable, unless the licensee
had been expressly authorized to do so. 84 The court first mentioned that, al-
though the transferability of a copyright license was a question of first im-
pression in the Ninth Circuit, there was authority to support the proposition
that such licenses were not transferable as a matter of law.85 The plaintiff,
singer Emmylou Harris, recovered a money judgment and injunctive relief
against defendants for infringing her copyrights in certain songs.86 She had
granted a mechanical license to Jay-Gee Record Company, which subse-
quently filed bankruptcy and sold the licensed recordings to defendant
Suellen Productions. 87 Suellen Productions then transferred its manufactur-
78. Rudell, supra note 69; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 123, re-
printed in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5738.
79. Rudell, supra note 69.
80. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 123, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5738. The committee notes explain that the term "owner" can describe any number of peo-
pie who have a mere ownership interest in the copyright. Fellmeth, supra note 71, 14.
81. See generally Fellmeth, supra note 71, 14.
82. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 24, § 10.01(C)(1).
83. 734 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1989).
84. Id. at 1335.
85. Id. at 1333.
86. Id. at 133 1.
87. Id. "'Mechanical royalties' [are] paid for the use of musical compositions on phono-
graph records in all of the various formats .... The phrase was originally derived from player-
piano's perforated paper music rolls, the earliest form of music publishing royalties. DONALD E.
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ing and distribution rights to defendant Emus Recordings, which never paid
Harris royalties from the songs.88 Harris demanded that defendants cease
the manufacture and distribution of the songs and sued, alleging copyright
infringement.89 The court held that "[t]he release of the new album, without
new mechanical licenses, constituted copyright infringement for which de-
fendants are liable." 90 Relying on the 1909 Act, the court reiterated that,
"[a]bsent any contractual limitations, an assignee [of the whole contract]
had the right to reassign the work. A licensee, however, had no right to re-
sell or sublicense the rights acquired unless he has been expressly author-
ized so to do."9' The court agreed with a previous district court decision,
which described a licensee's copyright as "a bare license ... without any
right to assign its privilege." 92 At the time, this approach was warranted
under both the doctrine of indivisibility and by certain policies underlying
patent law.93
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: COMPARING FEDERAL COURTS' DIVERGENT
APPROACHES TO COPYRIGHT LICENSING
The extensive modification to copyright law left implicated parties
unsure as to the scope of the license, and whether it included the right to
transfer for copyright licensees.94 Because of this uncertainty, many dis-
putes over the scope of a license were left. unlitigated, as parties chose to
settle rather than be the first to litigate their issues under the 1976 Act. One
BIEDERMAN ET AL., LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRIES, 552-53 (Praeger
Publishers 4th ed. 2001). Record companies are responsible for paying artist royalties and royal-
ties for mechanical licenses. 17 U.S.C. § 115 requires a manufacturer of phonograph records to
enter into a license agreement with the copyright owner of each musical composition embodied
thereby. The record company pays the copyright owner a royalty for each of the records made and
distributed into the marketplace. For compositions that are first-time releases to the public, the
record company must negotiate for a mechanical license with the owner of the composition.
GARY STIFFLEMAN & BONNIE GREENBERG, ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY CONTRACTS §
159.03(l)(e) (Donald C. Farber ed., 2003) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 115).
88. Harris, 734 F.2d at 1332.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1335.
91. Id. at 1333 (quoting NIMMER, supra note 24, § 10.01(C)(4)).
92. Ilyin v. Avon Publications, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 368, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
93. Harris, 734 F.2d at 1333. Where precedent in copyright cases is lacking, it is appropri-
ate to look for guidance to patent law "because of the historic kinship between patent law and
copyright law." Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984). A patent
license has been characterized as "a naked license to make and sell the patented improvement as a
part of its business, which right, if it existed, was a mere personal one, and not transferable, and
was extinguished with the dissolution of the corporation." Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226, 233
(1886).
94. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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such ambiguity concerns a licensee's ability to transfer. Whether purpose-
ful or inadvertent, Congress left unanswered the question of whether an ex-
clusive license is considered a transfer of ownership, enabling the licensee
to further transfer the copyright.
95
Two divergent approaches to defining the scope of a license have
evolved. One view restricts a license to include only "such uses as fall
within the unambiguous core meaning of the term," excluding "any uses
that lie within the ambiguous penumbra., 96 Under this more restrictive
view, a strict statutory reading construes copyright law to preclude a licen-
see's right to transfer, since neither the 1909 or 1976 Copyright Acts enu-
merates such an exclusion. 97 The other, more expansive and accepted view,
is that a "licensee may properly pursue any uses which may reasonably be
said to fall within the medium as described in the license," including uses
within the ambiguous penumbra. 98 This approach permits courts to imply
legislative inferences, particularly in cases of statutory silence.99
A survey of the relevant case law reveals a circuit splinter among the
courts regarding a licensee's ability to transfer a copyright.100 The array of
disparate decisions reflects the various approaches courts have taken to de-
fine the scope of a license, ranging from highly restrictive to highly expan-
sive. As a consequence, subsequent courts have delivered inconsistent deci-
sions on the same issues of law.
A. Ninth Circuit Decisions
When Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1976, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals initially appeared to establish a policy seemingly contrary
to the 1909 Act: conferring to a licensee all property rights within the
"bundle of sticks," including the right to transfer.0'0 Only three years ago,
the Ninth Circuit court, in dicta, discussed an exclusive licensee's ability to
freely assign his rights without consent of the licensor.10 2 In Leicester v.
Warner Bros., although the plaintiff artist tested the boundaries of the 1976
Act, the court allowed exclusive licensee R & T (who is R&T? A defen-
95. See discussion supra Part II.B.
96. Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481, 486 (2d
Cir. 1998).
97. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 24, § 10.10(B).
98. Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 1968).
99. See discussion supra Part II.B.
100. See supra Part I.
101. Id.
102. See Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2000).
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dant?) to sublicense the copyrighted "sculptural work. 10 3 In that case, de-
veloper R & T entered into an agreement with the artist Leicester to create
a work of public art in downtown Los Angeles. 10 4 The contract allocated
the rights to two-dimensional and three-dimensional reproductions or rep-
resentations of the work between the developers and the artist.'0 5 The artist
granted the developers the exclusive, perpetual, irrevocable right to make
reproductions of three-dimensional representations for certain purposes, but
denied R & T the right to duplicate the work in another project. 10 6 In July
1994, R & T granted a license to the Warner Bros. movie studio to use
three-dimensional representations of the work in a movie. 10 7 The following
year the artist registered his copyright and sued Warner Bros. for copyright
infringement. 10 8 The circuit court held that sublicensing the architectural
work did not infringe upon plaintiffs rights because of an exception to the
Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990 regarding pictorial
representations of a building. 109 The decision hinged on the court's charac-
terization of the artistic work as "architectural," since, in general, such ar-
chitectural works are afforded more limited copyright protection." l0 The
court did mention the exclusive nature of the license, but did not discuss a
need for consent in sublicensing, simply stating, "R & T's ability to subli-
cense turns on whether R & T had an exclusive right to make Zanja Madre
miniatures." '' Since the developer's license was in fact exclusive, the artist
could not require the developer to obtain his consent before sublicensing
the copyright. 1 2 The court appeared to acquiesce to the notion that consent
was not necessary, therefore interpreting the 1976 Act to grant all copyright
ownership, including the presumed right to transfer, to an exclusive license
103. Id. at 1213. Leicester called the sculptural work "Zanja Madre." The work included
streetwall towers, a fountain representing "Mother Ditch," and a garden area. Id. at 1214.
104. Id. at 1214.
105. Id. at 1215.
106. Id. Specifically, R & T had exclusively licensed three-dimensional reproduction to
Warner Bros. (in sublicense), but did not have the right to sublicense photographic or other picto-
rial copies of Zanja Madre. Id.
107. See Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1215.
108. Id. at 1215.
109. Id. at 1216, 1220 (construing 17 U.S.C. § 120(a)).
110. Id. at 1216. Copyright protection of architectural work "does not include the right to
prevent the making, distributing, or public display of pictures, paintings, photographs, or other
pictorial representations of the work," if the building is ordinarily visible to the public. 17 U.S.C.
§ 120(a).
11. Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1220 (citing Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1333
(9th Cir. 1984)).
112. See id.
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holder." 3
Curiously, subsequent courts have not cited Leicester as precedent on
the sublicensing issue. This may be a result of two things either the Leices-
ter court's limited discussion of exclusive licensee's right to sublicense, or
the distinguishing nature of Leicester's facts to subsequent cases. The art-
ist's failure to register the copyright until after the developer granted the
sublicense, not the nature of the license, may have been fatal to his case.
14
In any case, the absence of discussion in Leicester leaves the impression
that the court believed that sublicensing was a non-issue and not a neces-
sary point of debate.' 1 5 Subsequent courts may be ignoring Leicester as
valid precedent because of its inadequate analysis. Regardless, mere dis-
agreement with Leicester's holding does not support the decision by courts
to ignore the implications of this relevant precedent.
Two years after Leicester, a Ninth Circuit court directly re-examined
the sublicensing question in Gardner v. Nike.' 16 The district court began its
opinion by stating that the case was one of first impression, never mention-
ing Leicester.17 The facts in Gardner were undisputed. 18 Nike and Sony
entered into a licensing agreement in 1992, conferring certain rights to
Sony to exploit a cartoon character called "MC Teach." 19 The licensing
contract specifically granted Sony:
[T]he right to use the character, and any modification or alterations, in
perpetuity throughout the world on and in the packaging of phonograph re-
cords, in publicity, advertising and allied exploitation of the records, in
television programs or motion pictures embodying the musical composi-
tions embodied on the records, on educational materials and on cloth-
113: See id.
114. Registration of copyright is not required in order for the work to be protected. See 17
U.S.C. § 102(a). However, registration is a prerequisite to filing an infringement suit on a work
first published in the United States. Id. § 411. Works published outside the United States need not
be registered prior to instituting an infringement action, except for certain works which are re-
corded as they are transmitted. See id. In order to recover statutory damages, the registration must
occur prior to the allegedly infringing act. Id. § 412(2). However, there is an exception where the
registration is made within three months of the date of first publication. Registration requires
submission of specified information regarding the applicant, deposit of a designated number of
copies, and payment of the required filing fee. Id. § 407-10.
115. The Leicester court only mentioned the ability of a licensee to sublicense because the
plaintiff argued that the district court erred in ruling that Warner Bros. acquired a license from R
& T to make a three-dimensional miniature model of the Zanja Madre. Leicester, 232 F.3d at
1220.
116. Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
117. Id. at 1285.
118. Id. at 1284.
119. Id. at 1283.
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120ing ....
Sony was conferred an exclusive, perpetual, worldwide license in ex-
change for fifteen percent of the profits earned from any use of MC Teach
in merchandise other than records. 12 Sony sought to exploit the character
through a third party, and accordingly transferred all its rights in the exclu-
sive license to Gardner in June 1996.122 Gardner subsequently utilized the
MC Teach character in various educational materials. 123 Once Nike be-
came aware of the sublicensing agreement, they threatened legal action
against Sony, Gardner, and their proposed licensees. 124 Gardner beat Nike
to court by quickly filing suit in California state court, alleging breach of
contract and requesting declaratory relief.125 The case was dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and Nike eventually filed a cause of ac-
tion in federal district court in December 1999.126
The federal court granted jurisdiction to the parties. Both Nike and
Gardner moved for summary judgment, with Gardner again seeking de-
claratory relief affirming that its license transfer from Sony was valid, and
Nike claiming lack of standing for Gardner due to the invalidity of its
rights. 27 The Court examined the language of the 1976 Act and under-
scored the congressional silence regarding the exclusive licensee's right to
transfer the license.128 Next, the court acknowledged that neither parties'
argument could be dispositively upheld by statute, since the 1976 Act does
not explicitly address exclusive license transferability; 29 because Congress
chose not to address the issue, the limiting "protection and remedies" lan-
guage indicates that the state of the law remains unchanged from the 1909
Act. 130 The district court held that an exclusive licensee does not have the
right to sublicense the copyright without the licensor's consent.
131
120. Id. at 1283 n.l.
121. Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774, 776 (9th Cir. 2002).
122. See id.
123. Gardner, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1283.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Gardner, 279 F.3d at 776-77. Nike asserted that the transfer of rights under licensing
contracts should be governed by the Copyright Act of 1976, not California state law. Id. at 777.
Nike made an initial attempt to remove the case from state court to the district court, but the dis-
trict court remanded the action to state court when Nike's removal petition was untimely. Id.
127. Id. at 777.
128. Id. at 780.
129. Id.
130. See Gardner, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1287.
131. See id.
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The court of appeals recently affirmed the district court's decision. 132
The Ninth Circuit appeared to be redefining the direction of the federal
standard for licenses in copyright law.
B. Beyond the Ninth Circuit
The crucial question was whether other circuit courts would validate
the Ninth Circuit precedent by following its holding. Up to this point, other
federal circuits had granted exclusive licensees broad rights under copy-
right.'33 Would they adopt the Ninth Circuit approach? Litigation outside
the Ninth Circuit prior to Gardner painted an unpromising picture. 1
34
Library Publications v. Medical Economics Co., a 1982 case in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, ad-
dressed the interpretation of section 201(d)(2) of the 1976 Act. 35 There, the
court maintained that an exclusive license was intrinsically assignable, but
did so only in dicta. 136 In Library Publications, the plaintiff, a book pub-
lisher and distributor, allegedly obtained an oral (nonexclusive) copyright
license to distribute the Physicians Desk Reference from the defendant pub-
lisher, the assignee of the copyright. 137 When the plaintiff "undersold" the
defendant to a large retail outlet, the move so frustrated the defendant that
he subsequently refused to sell the plaintiff any more books.138 The defen-
dant publisher justified withholding future sales by asserting that the plain-
tiff had violated the license.' 39 The court interpreted section 201(d) as con-
ferring to an exclusive licensee the right to "transfer, in whole or in part,
any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright."' 140 Nevertheless, even
though the district court established that the defendant could have granted
an exclusive license to the plaintiff, he did not succeed because an exclu-
sive license cannot be granted orally. 141 The defendant's case failed be-
cause the license was not reduced to writing, and the court never ruled on
the issue of transferability under an exclusive license. 1
42
132. Gardner, 279 F.3d at 776.
133. See, e.g., Library Publ'ns, Inc. v. Med. Econ. Co., 548 F. Supp. 1231, 1233-34 (E.D.
Pa. 1982), aff'd, 714 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1983).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1233.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1232.
138. Id.
139. Library Publ'ns, 548 F. Supp. at 1232.
140. Id. at 1233.
141. Id. at 1234.
142. Id.
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In re Patient Education Media, Inc. 143 was an early case which hinted
at restraining a licensee's right to transfer, yet critical flaws in the court's
interpretation of section 201(d)(2) forced other courts to subsequently re-
ject its holding.' 44 There, a debtor licensee obtained a nonexclusive license
to use a licensor's copyrighted photographs. 145 When the licensee later filed
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, he attempted to sell the non-exclusive license
for use of the copyrighted photographs, though the licensor emphatically
opposed the sale. 146 The court held that the debtor licensee could not sell
the license because "[t]he federal policy designed to protect the limited
monopoly of copyright owners and restrict unauthorized use ... pre-
vent[ed] the trustee from assigning the nonexclusive license absent the
owner's consent." 147 In weighing the opposing policy arguments, the court
acknowledged that, "[a]lthough the assignment of the.., license [would]
maximize the assets available to creditors, this goal [had to] give way to the
countervailing considerations expressed in § 365(c).' ' 148 The court con-
cluded that on this basis, the debtor licensee could not assign his nonexclu-
sive license without the licensor's consent.1
49
Gardner and other related cases do not discuss the court's holding in
In re Patient Education Media because of a critical flaw in its reasoning.1 50
The central mistake in the court's logic was its misstatement of 17 U.S.C. §
201(d)(2) as granting an exclusive licensee all "rights and protections" of
the copyright owner to the extent of the license; 151 the Act's actual lan-
guage grants the licensee all "protection[s] and remedies" of the copyright
owner. 152
The Second Circuit finally solidified its support of Gardner in the
2002 case Ward v. National Geographic Society.153 There, plaintiff photog-
rapher sued National Geographic Magazine and its sublicensed computer
software companies for selling digital archives of all past issues of the
magazine on CD-ROM and DVD.' 54 The plaintiff had worked as a free-
lance photographer and writer for National Geographic from 1964 to 1978,
143. 210 B.R. 237 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997).
144. See, e.g., Gardner, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1287 n.4.
145. In re Patient Educ. Media, Inc., 210 B.R. at 239.
146. Id. at 240.
147. Id. at 242.
148. Id. at 243.
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., Gardner, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1297 n.4.
151. In re Patient Educ. Media, Inc., 210 B.R. at 240 (emphasis added).
152. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (emphasis added).
153. 208 F. Supp. 2d 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
154. Id. at 431-33.
202 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 24:185
during which time the parties infrequently memorialized the terms of their
agreements in writing.155 The case hinged on Ward's ownership of the valid
copyrights, a tall order given that Ward's engagement resembled work for
hire.156 The court for the Southern District of New York found that the pre-
sumption arose that National Geographic owned the copyright in the pho-
tographs on the work for hire rationale.'5 7 However, Ward rebutted Na-
tional Geographic's argument by establishing "a genuine issue of fact
regarding the existence of an ... implied agreement to the contrary,"'
5 8
First, Ward testified that it was regular custom and practice during the 60's
and 70's for magazines to hire photographers for "one-time rights," re-
marking that he had done "thousands of assignments under these condi-
tions.' ' 9 What the court found particularly convincing was the testimony
of Robert Gilka, a former director of photography at National Geographic
who gave Ward his assignments during the period of time in question.
60
Gilka testified that the rate National Geographic paid to Ward was not the
typical amount it would have had to pay "in order to obtain 'all rights"' in
his work, and that the magazine "was not interested in and therefore did not
acquire the copyright to the [freelancer's] works."' 61 The court also relied
on evidence produced by Ward showing that National Geographic repeat-
edly paid Ward to reuse his work. 162 Although there were certain admissi-
155. Id. at 431. Some of plaintiffs assignments were put into writing, but the terms rarely
specified who retained the rights to the photographs, and whether those rights were exclusive or
not. Id. at 433-34.
156. Id. at 435. To establish a prima facie case for copyright infringement, a plaintiff must
establish (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 24, §
13.01, at 13-5 & n.5 (2003) (citing Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90
(2d Cir. 1976)).
157. Ward, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 437. "Once it is established that a work is made for hire, the
hiring party is presumed to be the author of the work. That presumption can be overcome, how-
ever, by evidence of a contrary agreement, either written or oral." Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas,
53 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir. 1995). "At trial, the burden is on the independent contractor to demon-
strate by a preponderance that such a contrary agreement was reached." Ward, 208 F. Supp. 2d at
435-36.
158. Ward, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 437. "Under New York law, '[a]n implied-in-fact contract
arises in the absence of an express agreement, and is based on the conduct of the parties from
which a fact-finder may infer the existence and terms of a contract."' Id. (citing AEB & Assoc.
Design Group, Inc. v. Tonka Corp., 853 F. Supp. 724, 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)). Plaintiff Ward
based the contract formation on the proposition that an implied-in-fact contract may be based on
industry custom. See Boyle v. Stephens Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15215 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28,
1998).
159. Ward, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 438.
160. Id. at 439-40.
16 1. Id. at 439.
162. Id. at 440. The court mentioned that it was unusual that defendants would pay Ward to
reuse work in which they claimed ownership. Id.
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bility problems with Gilka's testimony, the court finally held in the plain-
tiff's favor, granting partial summary judgment as to liability regarding his
copyright infringement claim. 63 The Ward court specifically expressed its
support of Gardner, stating that the court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that
the preferred policy was "to place the burden on the licensee to get the li-
censor's explicit consent during or after contract negotiations.' 64
IV. DISCUSSION
The dispute over a licensee's ability to sublicense under the 1976 Act
still may not be fully resolved. The Second Circuit in Ward acknowledged
that consent was required under the 1909 Act: "it is difficult to see how a
license under the 1909 Act has anything other than a personal right.'
' 65
Courts have not been so bold in promulgating a policy under the 1976
Act. 66 Gardner was the court's first big step in establishing a rule that
strikes an appropriate balance between economic incentives and public ac-
cess. 167 Nevertheless, harsh criticism continues to be expressed by indi-
viduals who support an expansive interpretation of copyright licensing.
68
A. Choice of Law: Federal or State?
One commentator disagrees not only with policy arguments in favor
of licensors, but also with the choice of law governing license agreement
cases. Aaron Xavier Fellmeth has written an extensive article in the Vir-
ginia Journal of Law and Technology concerning an exclusive licensee's
right in a copyright transfer. 69 Fellmeth maintains that the purpose of fed-
eral intellectual property law is not to promote an inherent property right of
the creator, 170 and he criticizes courts who have allowed copyright owners
to "reach out beyond the grave," essentially "strangling [sic] statutory or
163. Id. at 439-41. Gilka was not competent to testify regarding the state of mind of Na-
tional Geographic due to his lack of personal knowledge regarding the magazine's interests. 1d. at
439-40. Additionally, Gilka's statements that National Geographic did not acquire rights to cer-
tain photographs was inadmissible hearsay. Id. In spite of these problems, the assertions were
fairly admitted on the basis of being construed as evidence of Gilka's knowledge of the industry
custom Ward referred to in his testimony. Id.
164. Id. at 442 (quoting Gardner, 279 F.3d at 781).
165. Ward, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 442.
166. See Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774, 780-81 (9th Cir. 2002).
167. Id.
168. See Fellmeth, supra note 70, at 4-6.
169. Id. at 9.
170. Id. at 10.
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common law rights of licensees.",1 7' The crux of Fellmeth's argument,
however, is that state rather than federal law should have been applied in
Gardner and other licensing cases.17 2 State common law rights concerning
copyright law were significant prior to the 1976 Act as a result of outdated
federal copyright regulation. 7 3 Under the Supremacy Clause, once the
1976 Act became effective, all conflicting state laws were preempted. 74 In
his article, Fellmeth argues that there is no state law that clearly conflicts
with federal policy, and therefore no preemption.175 However, the 1976 Act
contains a provision that explicitly allows federal law to preempt pertinent
state law.' 7 6 A thorough rebuttal to these contentions would reach beyond
the scope of this article, but it suffices to say that since 1976, courts have
applied federal rather than state law to cases regarding copyright licens-
ing. 177
Opponents to Gardner, including Fellmeth, tend to blur the lines of
distinction between a license and an assignment. Maintaining a definitional
separation between these terms is critical, since it is presumed that a copy-
right claimant's reason for granting a license, rather than an assignment, is
to retain some rights in the copyright. 7 8 Licensors argue that, at a mini-
mum, they retain some control over further sublicensing of the granted
rights. 179 Neither the 1976 Act nor the Legislature has specifically articu-
lated the scope of the interest, if any, that the licensor retains after an ex-
clusive license is granted.
80
171. Id.
172. Id. at 33.
173. See generally id. at 10.
174. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States, which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
See also 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2000) (describing the federal preemption with respect to other
laws).
175. Fellmeth, supra note 70, at 29-34. The author believes that Congress intentionally
limited the Copyright Act to very restrictive provisions regarding copyright licensing in order for
state law to fill in these gaps. Id.
176. KELLER & CUNARD, supra note 56, § 1:3.2.
177. See, e.g., Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774, 777-78 (9th Cir. 2002).
178. See Ward, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 442.
179. See generally Fellmeth, supra note 71, at 9-10, 12.
180. See generally, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 stat. 2541 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
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B. Legitimacy of Contemporary Copyright Policy
It is not unreasonable to limit a licensee's treatment of his interest in a
copyright. Requiring a licensee to obtain consent from the licensor to subli-
cense the copyright is both logical and fair. From the inception of copyright
law, one of the central purposes of copyright protection was to enable crea-
tors of intellectual property to guard and control their interests. 8' It is un-
justifiable to assume that, in the absence of explicit language regarding
sublicensing, the default rule compels a licensor to essentially lose all abil-
ity to steer the direction of the interest. The most obvious problem would
arise in a situation where a license is granted for a specific duration,
whereby the interest reverts back to the licensor at its conclusion. The
original copyright owner clearly has an interest in the means a licensee em-
ploys to exploit the copyright during that limited term of the license.
In re Patient Education Media presents a similar situation that would
disadvantage a licensor, assuming an exclusive license is the functional
equivalent of an assignment. 82 Had the bankruptcy creditors been able to
claim the copyright licensee's copyright interests, the licensor may have
seen his interest pass on to an unknown third party who was likely indiffer-
ent to the licensor's intentions. The situation in Ward further demonstrates
the harmful ramifications that can arise when licensors are not consulted in
decisions regarding the copyright. 183 The defendant in Ward, a sublicensee
CD-ROM distributor called Mindscape, drafted an initial copyright notice
which stated that the product contained "clipart and photo images" that the
consumer was "free to use, modify and publish.., as you wish."' 8 4 The
wording of this notice was only modified after National Geographic as-
serted it had not authorized the language, and that Mindscape was respon-
sible for rectifying the situation. 185 One can only imagine how devastating
the original notice would have been to Ward's career; virtually all of his
most prized work would have been released to the public, who could have
had unrestrained use of his photographic portfolio. Clearly, the licensor po-
tentially has much more at stake than the licensee; simply inferring licensor
indifference from the absence of express language regarding sublicensing
181. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 123, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5660.
182. In re Patient Educ. Media, Inc., 210 B.R. 237 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997).
183. See Ward, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 442-43.
184. Ward, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 433 n. 15. The final approved notice informed end-users that
"Mindscape and its suppliers grant you the right to use one copy of the Program for your personal
use only" and that "[y]ou must treat the [p]rogram and associated materials and any elements
thereof like any other copyrighted material." Id. at 433.
185. Id. at 433 n. 15.
206 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:185
would initiate damaging implications for copyright licensors.
186
The argument that the licensor should have included specific lan-
guage in the agreement regarding consent before sublicensing may be rea-
sonable, but it does not justify the resulting situation in absence of such
language. By definition, licensors retain some interest in the copyright,
187
otherwise, the copyright owners would have granted an assignment, not a
license. In Ward, the Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that "there are
strong policy reasons to place the burden on the licensee to get the licen-
sor's explicit consent either during or after contract negotiations."'
' 88
Licensees should shoulder the responsibility to include specific lan-
guage in an agreement that allows unrestrained sublicensing of the copy-
right. Critics of Gardner have argued that there was an implied "expecta-
tion" in the original agreement that Sony would sublicense the copyright in
order to efficiently exploit MC Teach.1 89 The inference was apparently due
to prior dealings and business practices.190 It is not enough to have an "ex-
pectation" that certain elements will likely be exploited through other
channels. If sublicensing is contemplated at the time the contract is formed,
the licensee must explicitly include such terms, rather than rely on an as-
sumed expectation of the other party's intent. 191
Critics have claimed that licensors are only concerned with receiving
royalties for the exploitation of the copyright, and are not interested in how
the money is earned, just that they receive the minimum compensation by
the deadline established contractually with the licensee. While this ap-
proach may prove true in some cases, the nature of the licensor's interest
depends on the type of copyrighted material being granted and his personal
attachment to it. An individual artist, such as the plaintiff in Leicester, ar-
guably has more of a vested, personal concern for the copyright's use.1 92
On the other hand, one may assume that Nike would have only been con-
cerned with receiving its royalties, and presume that the means by which
186. Id. at 442-43.
187. Id. at 441.
188. Id. at 442 (quoting Gardner, 279 F.3d at 781). The court in Gardner mentioned "the
necessity to preserve the rights and control of the owners and creators." Gardner, 279 F.3d at
781.
189. See Fellmeth, supra note 71, at 8-9.
190. See id.
191. Ward, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 442; see also Gardner, 279 F.3d at 781.
192. This line of reasoning loosely reflects a "natural rights" rhetoric, which justifies recog-
nizing property rights in works of authorship "based on the rights of authors to reap the fruits of
their creations, to obtain rewards for their contributions to society, and to protect the integrity of
their creations as extensions of their personalities." See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 19, §
1.06(C)(1).
2004] AN EXCLUSIVE LICENSEE'S ABILITY TO SUBLICENSE A COPYRIGHT 207
Sony obtained Nike's payments was immaterial. This assumption proved
incorrect, as seen by Nike's disapproving reaction to Sony's sublicensing to
Gardner. 193 In any case, one cannot assume that royalties are the only con-
cern of all copyright licensors. Copyright owners, in general, do not share a
uniform position regarding royalty collection that would rationalize such an
argument. 194
Even if a licensor's only interest was to secure her share in collecting
royalties, this is a legitimate interest that the copyright claimant is entitled
to protect.' 95 The Harris case addressed this point, indicating that the gran-
tor of a license reserved the right to collect royalties, and that "his ability to
monitor use would be jeopardized by allowing sublicensing without no-
tice.' ' 196 The court in Ward warned that "copyright owners who grant non-
exclusive licenses might find themselves involuntarily competing with their
own licensees for future licensing opportunities if sublicensing were per-
mitted without permission." 197
C. Implications of Licensee Consent: How Does Gardner Affect Copyright
Law?
The implications of Gardner go beyond the facial policy issues in the
case, delving into important concepts that lie at the core of copyright law.
The court in Gardner supported the notion that the scope of a copyright li-
cense should be limited to those rights which are specifically stated in the
parties' agreement.' 98 It follows that a license "includes only such uses as
fall within the unambiguous core meaning of the term.., and exclude any
uses that lie within the ambiguous penumbra."' 99 While this restrictive ap-
proach may be unpopular among contemporary scholars,200 such a con-
struct furnishes copyright agreements with the certainty and clarity that are
essential to all contracts.20 t Other courts beyond Gardner have begun to
193. See generally Gardner, 279 F.3d 774.
194. See, e.g., id. at 776-77; Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1215.
195. By granting a license rather than an assignment in copyright, a copyright owner re-
serves certain rights, including, in some cases, the right to collect royalties. See Ward, 208 F.
Supp. 2d at 442.
196. Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Ward,
208 F. Supp. 2d at 442.
197. Ward, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 442-43.
198. Gardner, 279 F.3d at 781.
199. Boosey & Hawkes Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481, 486 (2d Cir.
1998).
200. See id. at 487.
201. See generally ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 4.1 (Revised edition,
1993).
208 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:185
support this view in their recent decisions.20 2 Theoretically, the debate over
the licensee's right to transfer can be summarized by the two approaches
mentioned in Part III regarding the scope of a license: the strict textual
reading of the statute versus the ambiguous penumbra of rights.
Courts and commentators have fallen on both sides of the issue re-
garding statutory interpretation. Some prefer the latter approach as opposed
to the strict textual standard, which, they say, would unduly burden licen-
sees by requiring them to obtain further clarification on the meaning in-
tended in the license.20 3 Both camps recognize that flexibility is necessary
when technological advances create new mediums of exploitation for a
copyright. 0 4 But a line must be drawn when contract interpretation extends
beyond the scope of the language. In the words of the Second Circuit,
"[T]he burden still falls on the party advancing a deviation from the most
reasonable reading of the license to insure that the desired deviation is re-
flected in the final terms of the contract., 20 5 That statement specifically ad-
dressed whether the reasonable reading of the defendant's license extended
to uncontemplated future technology.20 6 The court's opinion is an extension
of the restrictive approach, further illustrating the judiciary's recent hesita-
tion to infer contract meaning outside of enumerated terms.20 7
Despite the contract's silence on the issue, when applying this con-
cept, a reading of a license that promulgates no required consent by the li-
censor is "a deviation from the most reasonable reading. 20 8 It follows that
the burden should fall on the licensee, who is advancing such a deviation,
to insure that his desired meaning is reflected in the license's final terms.
The restrictive approach should be utilized for all other circumstances to
202. See Ward, 208 F. Supp. 2d 429.
203. See Boosey & Hawkes Publishers, Ltd., 145 F.3d at 488.
204. The Second Circuit reiterated this concept, stating that "if the broad terms of the li-
cense are more reasonably read to include the particular future technology in question, then the
licensee may rely on that language." Id.
205. Id.
206. See id. The court's final decision urged clarity in defining contractual terms concerning
potential future uses:
By holding contracting parties accountable to the reasonable interpretation of their
agreements, we encourage licensors and licensees to anticipate and bargain for the
full value of potential future uses. Licensors reluctant to anticipate future develop-
ments remain free to negotiate language that clearly reserves the rights to future
uses. But the creation of exceptional principles of contract construction that places
doubt on the capacity of a license to transfer new technologies is likely to harm li-
censors together with licensees, by placing a significant percentage of the profits
they might have shared in the hands of lawyers instead.
Id. at 488 n.4.
207. Gardner, 279 F.3d at 781.
208. Boosey & Hawkes Publishers, Ltd., 145 F.3d at 488.
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promote clarity in the license agreement. The intent of the parties should be
fully reflected by the copyright agreement, except in cases of implied col-
lateral rights that are incorporated in a copyright grant.20 9 Adopting the
strict textual approach promotes retaining leverage in the copyright claim-
ant. This, in turn, supports this paper's thesis that the licensee does not ac-
quire an absolute and unconditional entitlement in the copyright.
D. Criticism of Gardner
Critics of Gardner have attacked the court's holding and argued that
alternative approaches should have been utilized by the court. None of
these arguments is convincing, however. The Gardner court should be
commended for boldly initiating a now-accepted copyright policy.
Commentators disagree with Gardner's default sublicensing policy
that puts sublicensing control in the hands of the licensor.210 Had state law
been applied by the court in Gardner, this default position would have
likely shifted to the licensee since the agreement was silent as to the subli-
censing issue. 21' This argument is flawed for two reasons. First, the court
has clearly established that federal law preempts state, law in matters of
copyright. 1 2 Second, by allowing such "flexibility" to seep into licensing
policy, courts would be conferring untenable rights upon licensees while
unjustifiably exposing licensors' reputations to possible "scandal . . . or
improper use," subject to the behavior of the licensee.21 3 It is not burden-
some to retain the established default rule, which simply requires parties to
include boilerplate language to free the licensee from necessarily obtaining
licensor permission before sublicencing, should they agree to such a term.
Critics of Gardner have suggested amending the Copyright Act in or-
der to "better clarify its meaning." 214 Some go so far as to suggest changing
the language of 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) by adding "ownership rights" to the
"protections and remedies" language.1 5 Such "clarity" of the statute is both
unnecessary and contrary to the legislature's intent. Drafters of the 1976
209. 3.NIMMER, supra note 24, § 10.10(C). Collateral grants are those interests which must
be granted for full enjoyment of the copyright. For example, a license to record a musical work
implies the collateral right to distribute and sell such records. Id.
210. See Kate Williams, Gardner v. Nike, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 371, 386 (2003).
211. See Gardner, 279 F.3d at 780.
212. See discussion supra Part V.A.
213. Williams, supra note 210, at 387.
214. Id. at 390.
215. 17 U.S.C. § 201(D)(2) (enumerating what rights the legislature confers to exclusive
licensees); Williams, supra note 210, at 390 (suggesting the addition of the "ownership rights"
language to 17 U.S.C. § 201(D)(2)).
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Act could have granted broad ownership rights to licensees if that was their
intent-they did so in other sections 216 and intentionally narrowed the
scope of the right bestowed by section 201(d)(2). Additionally, the courts
have already determined that their interpretation of section 201 (d)(2) does
not include the broad ownership rights that these suggested language
changes would allow. It is not necessary to change the law if courts have
spoken to clarify the issue. In the present case, the two leading entertain-
ment circuits-the 9th Circuit and the 2nd Circuit-have been vocal in de-
finitively limiting a licensee's right to sublicense.21 7 It is therefore unneces-
sary to amend what the courts consider a resolved, moot point.
E. Promoting and Protecting New Technology
New technology has posed novel questions to lawmakers regarding
copyright law.218 Specifically, technological developments that allow re-
production of copyrighted material by easy, inexpensive means have cre-
ated problems for owners of copyrighted material. 219 The Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA) was drafted to bring the Copyright
220Act up to date with technological developments.
Several DMCA provisions enabled copyright owners to better protect
their interest by utilizing new technology to outlaw certain technological
advances that individuals have used to pirate intellectual property.22' For
instance, the DMCA prohibits individuals from circumventing technical
measures that copyright owners had used to both (1) limit access to a work
and (2) prevent its unauthorized reproduction.222 Requiring consent in sub-
licensing echoes this policy and promotes the development and protection
of new technology. 223 A balance is retained between the public's access to
information, inventions, and art on one hand, and the need to grant creators
the incentive to continue to produce works on the other. This effectively
rewards the "beneficent efforts of genius" and encourages the useful arts
216. Cf 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) ("The copyright in such [compilation or derivative] work is in-
dependent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any
copyright protection in the preexisting material." (emphasis added)).
217. See Gardner, 279 F.3d at 776; see also Ward, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 442.
218. 3 NIMMER, supra note 24, § 10.10(B).
219. See Hitchcock & Needleman, supra note 14, at 541.
220. Id. at 542.
221. KELLER & CUNARD, supra note 57, § 1:3.8.
222. Id. Such allowed technical measured included encryption that conditioned access to
certain areas, and encryption or other measures that limit the right to use a work. Id.
223. See Gardner, 279 F.3d at 781.
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without compromising public access to these ideas. 22 4 Inventors, artists, and
other creators of new technology require statutory assistance to enable
them to effectively protect their products. 225 The consent requirement for
licensees will serve as another tool to aid licensors in protecting their
work,22 6 which will, in turn, foster continued technological progress as op-
posed to stifling copyright development. 2 7 Much has been written both
supporting and criticizing the DMCA since it went into effect in 1998, and
further challenges will undoubtedly arise as technology continues to
evolve.
228
In the end, a licensor has an intangible, yet significant, future interest
in his granted copyright. Because a licensor always retains this interest, a
licensee, even in the case of an exclusive license, always obtains a qualified
right to transfer.229 The licensee is not entirely denied of the right to trans-
fer; rather, the right is merely limited, contingent upon the consent of the
licensor.
230
F. Alternative Approaches to License Analysis
Though the courts have seemingly resolved the issue of consent in
exclusive licensing,2 31 this may not be the end of the story. The current ap-
proach employed by the judiciary to analyze this issue may be flawed.232
Courts may want to consider one of the following alternative frameworks
to truly resolve this problem. A solution that may appease both licensors
and licensees would be to divide copyright licensing schemes into catego-
ries according to the function of the property interest in question. The rights
granted would be tailored to the needs of the parties, who could thereafter
modify the terms further in negotiations. The purpose of the categories
would be to start the parties off in a position most practical for their needs,
rather than using one licensing scheme as a panacea for all licenses.
Rather than attempting to develop one overlying rule, lawmakers
224. Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1878).
225. See Gardner, 279 F.3d at 781.
226. See Ward v. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y, 208 F. Supp. 2d 429, 442-43 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
227. See generally JOYCE ET AL., supra note 19, § 1.03(B).
228. A comprehensive discussion of copyright protection in the digital age and the ramifica-
tions of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act of 1998 can be read in Hitchcock & Needleman,
supra note 14.
229. The appropriate analogy is that the licensor obtains part of the "stick" representing the
right to transfer within the bundle of sticks.
230. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(l).
231. See generally Gardner, 279 F.3d 774; see also Ward, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 429.
232. See discussion supra Part Il1.
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could identify each work by the nature of the use so that the language could
be customized to fit the most logical applications to each term. If the con-
tract fell into a category that necessarily required consent by the licensor
for sublicensing, then the court would approach the dispute from such a
framework. Conversely, an entire industry may for all practical purposes
intuitively regard sublicensing as a conferred right to exclusive licensors.
This categorizing process would be time-consuming and would initially
cause added confusion to the debate, but the final result may be worth the
effort. The law has systematically altered as a result of the continual devel-
opment of new uses for licensed material. 33 Retaining the original basis for
granting rights is outweighed by current needs for use-specific legisla-
234tion.
Another practical solution may be for courts to develop an alternative
approach to analyzing exclusive licenses. In fact, a shift in the theoretical
structure may ultimately lead courts to the conclusion that the decisions of
Leicester and Gardner were reconcilable. Courts presented with the ques-
tion of whether consent is necessary in a licensing case could apply a multi-
factor test to conclude whether requiring consent is actually logical. Possi-
ble factors for the court to consider are (1) the type of copyright license
granted, (2) the extent of the right in copyright conferred, (3) the course of
dealing and course of performance of the parties, and (4) sophistication of
the parties. Had this test been utilized, the Ninth Circuit may have con-
cluded that, considering the totality of the circumstances, consent was re-
235quired in Gardner, but not in Leicester. This approach would not conflict
with the current Copyright Act, which is silent on the issue and therefore
does not prohibit multiple analyses of different circumstances under the
same issue.2 36 A test such as this makes sense in the current technological
environment, which may require additional nuances to an increasingly
complex area of law.
V. CONCLUSION
Neither the 1909 Act nor the 1976 Act explicitly address an exclusive
licensee's right to transfer, and very little precedent or commentary exists
regarding this topic.2 3 7 Until recently, a shift away from requiring consent
233. See Kang & Yang, supra note 1, at 366.
234. See id. at 366-67.
235. See Gardner, 279 F.3d 774; see also Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212 (2000).
236. See discussion supra Part II.A.
237. See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909); see also Copy-
right Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered 17
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seemed to be developing.238 An audible constituency began voicing its sup-
port of permitting sublicenses without the licensor's consent, and for some
time the courts agreed.239 However, in the past few years, the courts have
begun to align in favor of requiring express licensor consent. 240 Recent de-
cisions have retained both the explicit text of the 1976 Copyright Act and
significant policy arguments in favor of promoting new technology. 241 This
U.S.C.).
238. See Licensee May Not Transfer Exclusive Rights Without Licensor's Consent Under
1976 Act. BNA's Intellectual Property Professional Center, PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT
JOURNAL (2003) at
http://ipcenter.bna.com/pic2/ip.nsf/c9136ec2a0a6115985256a0f001 2e350/dc5b00ed293e3957852
56cc3004e3a7d?OpenDocument&Highlight=2,1icensee (last visited Feb. 2, 2003).
239. See Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212, 1213 (9th Cir. 2000).
240. See generally Gardner v. Nike, 279 F.3d 774 (2002); see also Ward v. Nat'l Geo-
graphic Soc'y, 208 F. Supp. 2d 429 (2002).
241. See generally Gardner, 279 F.3d 774.
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approach is consistent with both the statutory language and sound policy.
Courts may conclude that an alternative approach should be applied in fu-
ture cases. However, as it stands, the current controversy regarding the
scope of a licensee's right to transfer a copyright has been finally and accu-
rately resolved.
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